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Abstract
In this thesis we study methods for behavioral malware detection, which use techniques of
formal verification. In particular we build on the works, which use inference of tree automata
from syscall dependency graphs, obtained by static analysis of LLVM IR. We design and
implement a prototype detector using the LLVM compiler framework. For experiments with
the detector we use an obfuscating compiler capable of generating mutations of malware
from C/C++ source code. We discuss preliminary experiments which show the capabilities
of the detector and possible future extensions to the detector.
Abstrakt
Tato práce se zabývá metodami pro behaviorální detekci malware, které využívají techniky
formální analýzy a verifikace. Základem je odvozování stromových automatů z grafů závis-
lostí systémových volání, které jsou získány pomocí statické analýzy LLVM IR. V rámci
práce je implementován prototyp detektoru, který využívá překladačovou infrastrukturu
LLVM. Pro experimentální ověření detektoru je použit překladač jazyka C/C++, který je
schopen generovat mutace malware za pomoci obfuskujících transformací. Výsledky před-
běžných experimentů a případná budoucí rozšíření detektoru jsou diskutovány v závěru
práce.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Information technologies and systems have found use in almost all aspects of human life.
From personal communication and entertainment to industrial manufacturing, services and
commerce. Because of this widespread adoption, safety and security of information systems
and the data they hold have become a major concern. Throughout the years, development
and administration of information systems has shown to be a complex task and errors are
a common occurence. These errors may pose a safety risk to anyone using the system.
Moreover, some of these errors can be abused by malicious parties to achieve goals that
are not in alignment with the wishes of a legitimate user. The answer to this problem is
twofold. By advancing the processes and technologies that we use to develop information
systems, we lower the number of errors and weaknesses that the system has prior to its use.
By carefully monitoring usage of the system after deployment, we lower the risk of abuse
of errors that were not discovered and corrected during developement.
Malware is a term used to describe any software primarily designed for malicious use
against a host information system. Common uses include causing damage to the host
system, denying usage of the host to legitimate users, and theft of data and computing
resources. Depending on its purpose and method of transfer, malware can be classified into
several families. For example, a trojan is malware that is introduced into a host, often by
a legitimate user, disguising itself as harmless software. On the other hand, a worm often
abuses an error in the host system to gain access. Both of these are examples of malware
that function as standalone pieces of software. Viruses, in contrast to trojans and worms,
need a host file or software to propagate. The term payload is often used to describe the
code that will carry out the intended use of the malware. A keylogger will log keystrokes
to gather sensitive information about the systems users, while a backdoor will grant access
to the host system to an illegitimate user.
As a means to protect information systems and user data, security systems were de-
veloped. Examples include firewalls, which come in the form of hardware and software
or intrusion detection and intrusion prevention systems. But probably the most common
security system is antivirus software. The former can be described as passive measures
since they mitigate threats that are already being carried out by a human agent or mal-
ware. Antiviruses, on the other hand, were originally designed to protect against malware
by actively scanning files present in the host system.
With the introduction of antiviruses, malware authors had to come up with ways to hide
the presence of their malware in a host system. One method of achieving this is obfuscation.
The goal of obfuscation is to make malware hard to distinguish from legitimate software
by changing the malware in a way that preserves its original functionality or purpose.
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Obfuscations that primarily change how the malware appears as a file, are called syntactic,
while those which change how the malware functions while preserving its intended purpose
are referred to as semantic.
As a reponse, antivirus developers needed to implement methods that can detect mal-
ware despite being obfuscated. As with malware, detection methods that focus on the
appearance of malware as a file in a host system are syntactic, or often referred to as signa-
ture based, while methods that focus on the functionality of the malware are semantic, or
often called behavioral. Historically, signature-based detection was preferred for its speed
and scalability. However as obfuscation techniques evolved, the number of malware that
could bypass signature-based detection increased. Today the focus has shifted towards
behavioral detection.
The area of formal analysis and verification offers several approaches to behavioral
detection. One of these approaches is static analysis. The idea behind static analysis is to
gather data about possible behaviors of software directly from its code. In the context of
behavioral detection, the gathered data can be used to decide whether the analyzed code
is malware by comparing it to data gathered from known malware samples.
The goal of this work is to explore applications of static analysis to behavioral malware
detection and implement a prototype detector that applies static analysis in its detection
process. The work begins by giving a brief introduction to the challenges of detecting obfus-
cated malware in Chapter 2. In order to detect and classify malicious behavior descriptions
obtained by static analysis, suitable models and methods are proposed in Chapter 3. The
LLVM compiler infrastructure and its intermediate representation is also introduced in
Chapter 3 as a means to implement the mentioned static analyses. The design and imple-
mentation of a detector prototype is described in Chapter 4. An experimental evaluation
of the detector prototype is made in Chapter 5. Finally conclusion with a discussion about
choices that were made with possible alternatives and potential for future work is given in
chapter 6.
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Chapter 2
Malware Detection
Early research in the field of computer virology shows that perfectly reliable malware detec-
tion is theoretically impossible [4] and more recent research shows that practical malware
detection can be made computationally infeasible [8]. Despite these negative results, an-
tivirus software is comercially successful and research in the field of malware detection is
meaningful.
Since any method of malware detection is bound to be imperfect, there are several
metrics that are used in order to describe the performance of a malware detection method.
The number of false positive and false negative results over a test set of legitimate software
and malware respectively gives insight into the detection capabilities, while simple time
and memory consumption metrics give insight into the cost and potential scalability of the
detection method. Another useful distinction to make is whether the detection method is
capable of detecting malware that it has not seen before, but has seen similar malware in
terms of syntax or semantics, depending on the type of detector. This capability is referred
to as forward detection [3] or generalization [2].
This chapter aims to introduce topics that impact these metrics. From the point of
view of the malware itself, various types of obfuscation will be presented and a taxonomy
of malware based on obfuscation techniques will be presented. This part of the chapter is
based on [25], [21] and [23] From the detection point of view, the advantages, drawbacks
and overall principles behind syntactic and semantic detection will be introduced, taking
from [14] and again [23].
2.1 Obfuscation and Malware Taxonomy
A crucial part of any malware today is the ability to hide itself from detection in a host
system. The most commonly used technique to achieve this is obfuscation, which in te
context of computer programs can be defined as a transformation aimed to hide functionality
and hinder analysis. As a transformation it can be applied on any form the program
takes, from the original source code, down to the binary file. Figure 2.1 shows the typical
compilation chain of a C-like language with all the representations a program takes. In
the case of malware the most common obfuscations are applied to the binary file and on
the level of assembly code. It is interesting to note that obfuscations also find use in
the field of intellectual property protection in which they protect against unwanted reverse-
engineering. In this case the obfuscations are applied on the source code or the intermediate
representation used by the compiler or interpreter.
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Figure 2.1: Compilation chain of a C-like language
A prominent feature when using any kind of obfuscation is that, when applied in a
randomized manner, one can generate a number of different versions of the final malware.
These versions are referred to as mutations and the quality of an obfuscation technique is
often measured by the number of possible mutations it allows.
2.1.1 Packing, encryption and oligomorphism
Packing is a technique which uses compression algorithms to scramble the content of the
binary file [13]. A decompression procedure is then added to the compressed malware binary
so that when the executable is loaded into memory, it will first decompress the malware
code and then proceed to execute it. Packing also reduces file size which helps propagation
via size-limited channels e.g. email attachments.
Another common way of obfuscating binary files is through encryption. Similarily to
packing, the main malware body is encrypted using a simple cipher and a decryption
procedure is added to the result. The encryption key is often carried with the decryption
procedure or can be easily computed from data available to the decryption procedure. Most
commonly used ciphers include XOR ciphers, RC4 or TEA.
By using multiple packers or encryption procedures and keys one can obtain a size-
able number of possible mutations. Malware that generates its mutations in this manner
is oligomorphic. Although the number of possible mutations is high, the decompression
and decryption procedures themselves are not mutated. This produces an opportunity for
malware analysts to create signatures that target these procedures and detect oligomorphic
malware based on them.
2.1.2 Polymorphism
The solution to the shortcomings of oligomorphic malware is to mutate their decompression
and decryption procedures. Polymorphic malware achieves this by applying obfuscations
to the code of those procedures. Depending on the obfuscations applied the number of
possible mutations rises dramatically. The result is malware whose mutations share almost
no resemblance to each other as binary files and thus cannot be generally detected by
matching against byte signatures of binary files. A list of commonly used obfuscations
follows.
Dead code insertion Code with no effect is inserted into the original code. Common
examples include inserting NOP instructions between original assembly instructions or per-
forming XOR operations over two identical operands. While very simple to implement, it
is also very simple to reverse the transformation and recover the orignal code. Combined
with other obfuscations however, the inserted code may be further transformed and made
very hard to recognize as dead.
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INC  EBX
BSR  EAX, EDX
TEST EAX, DC78A946
MOV  EAX, EDX
PUSH EDX
MOV  DH,  86
MOV  BL,  27
INC  EBX
BSR  EAX, EDX
TEST EAX, DC78A946
MOV  EAX, EDX
NOP
NOP
INC  EDX
PUSH EDX
DEC  BYTE PTR SS:[ESP]
DEC  EDX
MOV  DH,  86
MOV  BL,  27
Figure 2.2: Example of dead code insertion
Register reassignment Operands of assembly code instructions are often stored in reg-
isters. The obfuscation changes the registers in which the operands of instructions are
stored. The number of possible mutations this obfuscations allows can be large depending
on the instructions used and number of registers available, however it can be easily cir-
cumvented via using inexact byte signatures. This technique was prominently used in the
Win95/Regswap virus.
MOV  ESI, EAX
MOV  AL,  BYTE PTR DS:[EAX]
TEST AL,  AL
JE   SHORT Test.00401054
PUSH EBX
MOV  ESI, EBX
MOV  BL,  BYTE PTR DS:[EAX]
TEST BL,  BL
JE   SHORT Test.00401054
PUSH EDX
Figure 2.3: Example of register reassignment
Subroutine reordering Also called code permutation is a transformation where stan-
dalone code segments such as subroutines or basic blocks can be randomly reordered to
produce up to 𝑁 ! mutations, where 𝑁 is the number of such segments. W32/Ghost is a
common example of a virus that uses this obfuscation.
_main: _sub1: _sub2: _sub3: _sub4:
_main: _sub3:_sub4:_sub2: _sub1:
Figure 2.4: Example of subroutine reordering
Instruction substitution The effect of a single instruction in code can be often emu-
lated via a sequence of instructions. Typical examples are simple arithmetic and boolean
operations which can be emulated in a number of ways each. Other substitutions include
moves between registers being replaced by PUSH and POP instructions on the assembly level.
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MOV77ESI,7EAX
MOV77AL,77BYTE7PTR7DS:[EAX]
TEST7AL,77AL
JE7SHORT7Test.00401054
.
.
.
BSR77EAX,7EDX
TEST7EAX,7DC78A946
MOV77EAX,7EDX
MOV77ESI,7EAX
MOV77AL,77BYTE7PTR7DS:[EAX]
OR777AL,7AL
JE7SHORT7Test.00401054
.
.
.
BSR77EAX,7EDX
OR777EAX,7DC78A946
MOV77EAX,7EDX
Figure 2.5: Example of instruction substitution
Code transposition Similar to subroutine reodreding, this obfuscation reorders instruc-
tions to change the binary file. If the reordered instructions are dependent, original exe-
cution order is restored via unconditional jumps. Depending on the code representation,
determining whether two instructions are dependent may require a non-trivial analysis.
instruction4
instruction5
jump out
garbage
_main:
instruction1
instruction2
jump 3
garbage
instruction3
jump 4
garbage
instruction2
jump 3
garbage
instruction3
jump 4
garbage
instruction5
jump out
_main:
instruction1
jump 2
instruction4
jump 5
instruction3
instruction4
jump 5
garbage
instruction5
jump out
_main:
instruction1
jump 2
garbage
instruction2
jump 3
garbage
Figure 2.6: Example of code transposition
Code integration A technique that uses another executable binary file for obfuscation.
The malware excutable targets a host executable, disassembles it, inserts its own code into
it and reassembles the host, preserving its original functionality. This way the malware
can generate as many mutations as there are executable binaries in the host system, while
providing other advantages like obfuscating the malware’s entry point, since the execution
of malware code is interleaved with the execution of the host binary. This obfuscation was
introduced in the famous W95/Zmist virus.
2.1.3 Metamorphism
The main weakness of polymorphic malware was the fact that even though the unpacking
and decryption procedures were mutated, the main malicious code was not. By allowing the
malware to run in a controlled environment, the malicious code would eventually appear in
memory and could be matched against a byte signature.
Metamorphic malware answers this weakness by applying obfuscating code transforma-
tions to the whole code of the malware, including the malicious parts. This way the malware
changes significantly from one mutation to another and leaves little space for simple byte
signature detection. The downside to this malware is the complexity of a mutation engine
capable of such code transformations. Figure 2.7 shows the process of generating a new
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mutation from an old one, once a metamorphic malware is executed. The best example of
an implementation is the virus Simile and its MetaPHOR mutation engine.
Locate own code Analyze
Transform
Decode
Assemble
Figure 2.7: Mutation stages of a metamorphic malware
2.2 Syntactic Detection
Historically malware detection techniques were centered around syntactic properties of a
binary file under inspection. These methods often look for specific byte sequences in files
and any file that contains a byte sequence that is deemed malicious is marked as malware.
The detection rates of these methods were heavily dependent on the length of the byte
sequence which was looked for and the structure of the malware code. The advantages of
this approach, to this day, are speed and scalability. The main disadvantage is that they
are easy to bypass using any kind of obfuscation. To circumvent this, several modifications
were introduced.
Wildcards The modification adds symbols with special semantics into the byte signature.
Consider Figure 2.8. The upper sequence of bytes is a part of the W32/Beast virus and
the lower sequence is the wildcard byte signature used to detect it. The ? symbol marks
an optional occurence of a half-byte, while %2 says that the next byte may occur twice in
the following two bytes.
83EB 0274 1683 EB0E 740A 81EB 0301 0000
83EB 0274 ??83 EB0? 740A 81EB %2   0301 0000
Figure 2.8: An example of a wildcard byte signature
Mismatches Allow an inexact matching of a byte signature. The following example illus-
trates an algorithm that allows a mismatch of three bytes. After encountering a mismatch,
the algorithm notes the mismatch and the next byte of the signature is used for matching.
Figure 2.9 shows a byte signature and three malware byte sequences that the signature
matches.
signature: 1122 3344 5566 7788 99AA
malware 1: A311 2233 C944 5566 0A77 8899 AABB
malware 2: 1134 2233 C444 5566 6777 8899 AABB
malware 3: 1122 3344 D4DD E555 6677 8899 AA
Figure 2.9: An example of mismatch byte signatures
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2.2.1 Algorithmic Scanning
As obfuscated malware grew more commonplace, detection moved to methods that used
malware-specific heuristics for detection. An example of such a heuristic is smart scanning
which was able to beat simple obfuscations by ignoring NOP instructions or by performing
matching only in the scope of basic blocks. X-Ray scanning on the other hand targeted
malware encrypted with weak ciphers. The method used a brute-force attack to uncover the
encryption key and once uncovered performed a byte signature matching over the decrypted
body. Filtering restricted detection to only those files that could contain malicious code.
Finally a generalized version of heuristic detection was dubbed algorithmic scanning and
introduced specialized malware description languages that aided the creation of detection
procedures. An algorithmic detector was then essentially an interpreter of such a language
coupled with a database of detection procedures.
2.2.2 Code Emulation
Emulation-based detection methods were developed as an answer to strong polymorphic
malware. In an emulation-based detector, the suspicious executable is allowed to run in
a controlled environment. In case of a polymorphic malware, the packed or encrypted
malicious code will eventually be exposed in the memory of the environment, where it can
be again detected by a byte signature.
The success of this method is however dependent on how precisely the controlled en-
vironment simulates a real host. If the malware detects that its running in a controlled
environment it can halt any malicious activity and perform bening computations. Or the
malware can exhibit its malicious behavior only under certain conditions, such as time or
a certain host system language localization.
The main disadvantage however is that an antivirus must not hinder a legitimate user
in his use of a system and its files. Therefore the detection method must be fast, which in
the context of an emulation-based detector means that it has only limited time to spend
on a single file. So the simplest way for a malware to avoid detection is to perform benign
computation until the detector runs out of time.
2.3 Behavioral Detection
With the advent of strongly polymorphic and metamorphic malware syntactic detectors
proved to be insufficient. The reason for this was the large number of syntactic signatures
that detection of such malware would require. Research has even proved that a syntactically
undetectable malware is possible [7].
The problem of strongly obfuscated malware was further demonstrated by the outbreak
of the Storm worm in 2007. The authors of Storm did not equip the worm with its own
mutation engine, instead they released a large number of mutations in bursts into the public
internet. This way the antivirus companies were not able to reverse-engineer the worms
mutation engine, thus come up with a suitable heuristic detection procedure in time.
The proposed solution to this are behavioral detection methods, which abstract from
how the malicious behavior is implemented and aim to detect the malicious behavior itself.
Many of the detection methods are directly related to methods used in software testing
and quality assurance. The advantage of this approach is its generality and robustness
against any kind of syntactic obfuscation. The main disadvantage is the high computational
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complexity of these methods. Figure 2.10 shows the structure of a generic behavioral
detector and serves as a reference point when classifying behavioral detectors.
The first phase of the detection process is data collection. In this phase the input
malware executable is analyzed, and raw characteristics about its behavior are collected.
These characteristics can be logs of actions the malware made while executed in a con-
trolled environment or assembly code obtained by disassembly of the executable file. Raw
characteristics tend to be very fine grained and need refining. This is done in the inter-
pretation phase, where the raw characteristics are analyzed and a high-level abstraction is
built. Action logs are typically interpreted into high-level events, like establishing a net-
work connection. Assembly code can be further analyzed to obtain dataflow or control
flow graphs. High-level abstractions can be used in two ways. If the input executable is
known to be malicious, the abstraction is used to generate a behavioral signature to enrich
the signature database used for matching. If the abstraction is unknown, it is matched
against the signatures in the database. The matching algorithm, the form of a behavioral
signature and the high-level abstraction are closely related. If the abstraction is a sequence
of high-level events, a state machine can be used as a behavioral signature and matching is
performed by checking if the state machine accepts the sequence. In the case of a dataflow
graph, the signature is typically a smaller dataflow graph representing malicious dataflow
and the matching is done by checking if the malicious dataflow graph is present in the
unknown dataflow graph.
Suspicious
input
Data
Collection
Raw
characteristics
Interpretation
Unknown
Abstraction
Malicious
Abstraction
Behav.
signature
DB
Prediction
Signature
generation
Behav.
signature
Matching
Detection
process
Figure 2.10: A generalized behavioral detector
Figure 2.11 shows a taxonomy of behavioral detectors as presented in [14]. The diagram
is vertically split into two parts according to the general approach to detection. The parts
themselves are divided further horizontally to describe the data structures and algorithms
used in each of the detection stages introduced in Figure 2.10. Finally the lower part of
the Figure shows how behavioral signatures are generated from known malware, while the
upper part shows how behavior is extracted from the environment in which malware can
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appear.
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Detection via
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Data
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Reference
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Behavioral Signature
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ManualAutomaticSignatureGeneration
Event
Trace
Program
Abstraction
Interpretation
Environment
Figure 2.11: A taxonomy of behavioral detectors
2.3.1 Simulation-based Detection
Based in black-box testing, this method analyzes malware behavior in a monitored environ-
ment during execution. This environment may be controlled, in which case code emulation
is employed, or in some applications the malware may be left to run on a live host.
Data collection Detectors of this type perform data collection by monitoring events
that the malware causes in the host system, be it a controlled environment or a live host.
Sequences of these events are called traces. An example of a trace is a sequence of system
calls or a sequence of sent network packets.
Interpretation Traces are then often interpreted into atomic behaviors. These often
represent a high level event in the host system e.g. opening of a file or establishing a
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network connection. Atomic behaviors can then be organized into sequences forming a
behavioral fingerprint of an inspected process.
Matching Matching is performed based on the model of malicious behavior. Common
models include weighted rule tables, graphs of atomic behaviors or state machines. The
prediction is then made based on a sum of weights and a threshold, existence of a path in
a graph or the acceptance of a state machine.
The advantages and disadvantages of this approach are closely tied to its dynamic na-
ture. One can only observe one of many possible behaviors at once, if code emulation is
employed, the malware can simply not perform malicious actions in the controlled environ-
ment and allowing execution on a live host presents considerable risks.
2.3.2 Detection via Formal Verification
Behavioral detection is commonly associated with dynamic analysis. This may seem short-
sighted given that the behavior of a program is fully specified by its code. In the context
of information system, formal verification is used to mathematically prove or disprove that
the system satisfies a given specification or that the system has a certain property. Applied
to malware detection the verified system is a representation of a computer program and the
property is the presence of known malicious behavior.
Data collection Since binary files are the most common representation of malware data
collection is done by static extraction. This task mainly involves disassembling the binary
file into assembly code, but unpacking and decryption are often needed as preliminary steps.
Interpretation Once a suitable code representation is obtained, methods for formal anal-
ysis and verification can be applied to build an abstraction of the program behavior. The
abstraction should model the program behavior in such a way that is robust against ob-
fuscations, but on the other hand should also provide a precise enough description so that
false positives stay low. Common abstractions include annotated semantic graphs derived
from the program data or control flow, expressions in abstract algebras or the state space
of the malware.
Matching Algorithms used for matching are directly linked to the chosen abstractions
and often can be reduced to solving problems tied to the abstraction. In the case of
annotated semantic graphs, matching can be reduced to the subgraph isomorphism problem,
where malicious behavioral signatures are represented as graph fragments and matched. In
the case of abstract algebra, the program abstraction is reduced using rewriting rules and
checked for equivalence with signatures represented by expressions as well. Finally in the
case of a state space abstraction, model checking algorithms are used to investigate whether
malicious properties represented by temporal logic formulae are satisfied by the state space.
The main advantage of detection by formal verification is that all possible execution
paths, therefore all possible behaviors of a potential malware are analyzed. This means
that techniques used to thwart dynamic analysis have little effect. The main disadvantages
however are the complexity of static extraction, since binary code is generally difficult to
analyze and can be obfuscated easily and the computational complexity of the algorithms
used for interpretation and matching. For example general subgraph isomorphism is a
NP-complete [11] problem while LTL model checking is a PSPACE-complete problem [22].
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Chapter 3
Preliminaries
This chapter introduces theoretical concepts that underlie the methods and algorithms used
in the behavioral detector presented in chapter 4 as well as the LLVM compiler infrastruc-
ture used to implement it. Abstract interpretation is introduced as a general framework
for building static program analyses and tree automata are presented as the formal model
used for matching abstracted program behavior with known malicious behavioral signa-
tures. The sections on static analysis and abstract interpretation are based on [24] and
corresponding chapters from [19]. Parts on tree automata and related notions are based on
[5] and [2]. Finally the overview of the LLVM project and its intermediate representation
is based on [16].
3.1 Static Analysis
The definition of what constitutes a static program analysis varies. Generally the term is
used to describe any kind of automated collection of information about a computer program
without executing the program. Under this definition, static analyses range from a simple
search for syntactic patterns to precise computations over a program abstraction and even
model checking which systematically searches the state space of a program.
As a collection of general methods and algorithms, static analysis is traditionally used
in compiler optimizations to identify redundant or ineffective code, code generators, where
it provides information needed to bridge the gap between code representations and tools for
formal verification, where it is used for quality assurance. Recently however information
security specialists and malware analysts have also found uses for static analysis when
evaluating system vulnerabilities and analyzing malware.
3.1.1 Partially Ordered Sets and Lattices
Definition 3.1.1 (Partially Ordered Set). Let 𝐿 be a set. A partial ordering (⊑) ⊆ 𝐿×𝐿
is a relation that is reflexive (∀𝑙 ∈ 𝐿 : 𝑙 ⊑ 𝑙), transitive (∀𝑙1, 𝑙2, 𝑙3 ∈ 𝐿 : 𝑙1 ⊑ 𝑙2 ∧ 𝑙2 ⊑ 𝑙3 ⇒
𝑙1 ⊑ 𝑙3) and anti-symmetric (∀𝑙1, 𝑙2 ∈ 𝐿 : 𝑙1 ⊑ 𝑙2 ∧ 𝑙2 ⊑ 𝑙1 ⇒ 𝑙1 = 𝑙2). For (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ ⊑ we
shall write 𝑥 ⊑ 𝑦, and 𝑥 @ 𝑦 if also 𝑥 ̸= 𝑦. The tuple (𝐿,⊑) is called a partially ordered set.
Definition 3.1.2 (Least Upper Bound). Let (𝐿,⊑) be a partially ordered set. A subset
𝑌 ⊆ 𝐿 has 𝑙 ∈ 𝐿 as an upper bound if ∀𝑙′ ∈ 𝑌 : 𝑙′ ⊑ 𝑙. An upper bound 𝑙 of 𝑌 is a least
upper bound, written as ⊔𝑌 , if ∀𝑙0 ∈ 𝐿 : 𝑙 ⊑ 𝑙0, where 𝑙0 is an upper bound of 𝑌 . Symbol
⊔ shall denote the join operator and for ⊔{𝑙1, 𝑙2} we shall write 𝑙1 ⊔ 𝑙2.
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Definition 3.1.3 (Greatest Lower Bound). Let (𝐿,⊑) be a partially ordered set. A subset
𝑌 ⊆ 𝐿 has 𝑙 ∈ 𝐿 as a lower bound, written ⊓𝑌 , if ∀𝑙′ ∈ 𝑌 : 𝑙 ⊑ 𝑙′. A lower bound 𝑙 of 𝑌 is
a greatest lower bound if ∀𝑙0 ∈ 𝐿 : 𝑙0 ⊑ 𝑙, where 𝑙0 is a lower bound of 𝑌 . Symbol ⊓ shall
denote the meet operator and for ⊓{𝑙1, 𝑙2} we shall write 𝑙1 ⊓ 𝑙2.
Definition 3.1.4 (Lattices). A join-semilattice or meet-semilattice is a partially ordered
set (𝐿,⊑) in which every pair of elements in 𝐿 has a least upper bound or greatest lower
bound, respectively. A semi-lattice is complete if every subset of 𝐿 has a least upper bound
or greatest lower bound. Furthemore ⊥ = ⊔∅ = ⊓𝐿 is the least element and ⊤ = ⊓∅ = ⊔𝐿
is the greatest element. A lattice (𝐿,⊑,⊔,⊓,⊥,⊤) is a partially ordered set that is a meet-
semilattice and a join-semilattice. A lattice is complete if it is a complete join-semilattice
and a complete meet-semilattice.
{1,2,3}
{2,3}{1,3}{1,2}
{2} {3}{1}
Ø
Figure 3.1: A Hasse diagram of the (2{1,2,3},⊆,∪,∩, ∅, {1, 2, 3}) lattice
Definition 3.1.5 (Chain). Let (𝐿,⊑) be a partially ordered set. A chain from 𝑥0 to 𝑥𝑛 is
a set 𝐶 = {𝑥0, 𝑥1, . . . , 𝑥𝑛} ⊆ 𝐿 where 𝑥0 @ 𝑥1 @ 𝑥2 @ · · · @ 𝑥𝑛.
Definition 3.1.6 (⊔−continuous function). Let (𝐴,⊑𝐴) and (𝐵,⊑𝐵) be lattices and 𝑓 :
𝐴 → 𝐵 a function. Function 𝑓 is monotone if ∀𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝐿 : 𝑥 ⊑𝐴 𝑦 ⇒ 𝑓(𝑥) ⊑𝐵 𝑓(𝑦).
Furthermore 𝑓 is ⊔−continuous if 𝑓(⊔𝐶) = ⊔{𝑓(𝑐)|𝑐 ∈ 𝐶} for every chain 𝐶 ⊆ 𝐴.
Definition 3.1.7 (Least Fixed Point). Let (𝐿,⊑) be a lattice and 𝑓 : 𝐿 → 𝐿 a function.
An element 𝑥 ∈ 𝐿 is a fixed point of 𝑓 if 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑥 and a least fixed point if ∀𝑦 ∈ 𝐿 : 𝑓(𝑦) =
𝑦 ⇒ 𝑥 ⊑ 𝑦.
Theorem 3.1.1 (Kleene Fixed Point). Let (𝐿,⊑,⊔,⊓,⊥,⊤) be a lattice and 𝑓 : 𝐴→ 𝐴 a
⊔−continuous function. The least fixed point of 𝑓 is 𝜇𝑓 = ⊔{𝑓 𝑖(⊥)|𝑖 ≥ 0}.
The Kleene fixed point theorem essentially tells that by repeatedly applying a ⊔−
continuous function 𝑓 over a lattice starting from the least element of the lattice, one will
eventually reach the least fixed point of 𝑓 while forming a chain along the way. This is very
useful when designing iterative algorithms over data that form a lattice. Such an algorithm
iteratively refines an approximate solution and is guaranteed to terminate if the lattice is
finite and the algorithm has the properties of a ⊔−continuous function.
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3.1.2 Abstract Interpretation
Pioneered by Patrick and Radhia Cousot in [6], abstract interpretation is a framework
for building static analyses based on lattices. The basic idea is to model the states a
computer program can be in via abstract contexts over an abstract domain that is suitable
for gathering the information that we want from the static analysis. If we wish to know the
possible values of integer variables in a program, we may use intervals of natural numbers
or convex polyhedra as our abstract domain. If we’re collecting information about strings,
we will probably use an abstract domain based in formal language theory.
Each instruction in the program is assigned an abstract transformer which emulates the
execution of the instruction in the abstract domain. An addition over two integer variables
will modify the intervals corresponding to those variables in the abstract context of the
program. Finally the analysis is done by iteratively computing the abstract contexts of the
program until the computation reaches a fixed point. In some cases however, e.g. programs
with loops, the reaching of a fixed point is not guaranteed. A widening operator over
abstract contexts which over-approximates the precise iterative solution may be introduced
to guarantee termination and speed up the analysis. The application of widening however
degrades the results of the analysis. Narrowing operators can be applied to the results of a
widening to refine the final result of the analysis.
Definition 3.1.8 (Abstract Interpretation). An abstract interpretation 𝐼 of a program 𝑃
with the instruction set Instr is a tuple
𝐼 = (𝑄, ∘,⊑,⊥,⊤, 𝜏)
where
∙ 𝑄 is the abstract domain (a set of abstract contexts),
∙ ∘ : 𝑄×𝑄→ 𝑄 is the join operator for accumulation of abstract contexts and (𝑄, ∘,⊤)
is a complete join-semilattice,
∙ (⊑) ⊆ 𝑄×𝑄 is a partial ordering defined as ∀𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝑄 : 𝑥 ⊑ 𝑦 ⇔ 𝑥∘𝑦 = 𝑦 in (𝑄, ∘,⊤),
∙ ⊥ is the least element of 𝑄,
∙ ⊤ is the greatest element of 𝑄,
∙ 𝜏 : Instr×𝑄→ 𝑄 defines an interpretation of abstract transformers.
Definition 3.1.9 (Widening). Let 𝐼 = (𝑄, ∘,⊑,⊥,⊤, 𝜏) be an abstract interpretation. For
the binary widening operator O the following holds:
∙ O : 𝑄×𝑄→ 𝑄,
∙ ∀𝐶,𝐷 ∈ 𝑄 : (𝐶 ∘𝐷) ⊑ (𝐶O𝐷),
∙ for all infinite sequences (𝐶0, 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑛, . . . ) ∈ 𝑄𝜔, it holds that the infinite sequence
(𝑠0, 𝑠1, . . . , 𝑠𝑛, . . . ) defined recursively as 𝑠0 = 𝐶0, 𝑠𝑛 = 𝑠𝑛−1O𝐶𝑛 is not strictly
increasing.
Definition 3.1.10 (Narrowing). Let 𝐼 = (𝑄, ∘,⊑,⊥,⊤, 𝜏) be an abstract interpretation.
For the binary narrowing operator △ the following holds:
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∙ △ : 𝑄×𝑄→ 𝑄,
∙ ∀𝐶,𝐷 ∈ 𝑄 : 𝐷 ⊑ 𝐶 ⇒ (𝐷 ⊑ (𝐶△𝐷) ⊑ 𝐶),
∙ for all infinite sequences (𝐶0, 𝐶1, . . . , 𝐶𝑛, . . . ) ∈ 𝑄𝜔, it holds that the infinite sequence
(𝑠0, 𝑠1, . . . , 𝑠𝑛, . . . ) defined recursively as 𝑠0 = 𝐶0, 𝑠𝑛 = 𝑠𝑛−1△𝐶𝑛 is not strictly
decreasing.
To ensure certain properties of the abstract interpretation with regard to the analyzed
program, one may employ Galois connections. The most common property investigated
is soundness which ensures that the abstraction over-approximates the behavior of the
analyzed program and thus can only produce false positives. In the context of malware
detection, this means that it may find malicious behavior that is present in the abstract
domain, but not in the program itself, assuming a precise specification of what malicious
behavior is given.
3.2 Tree Automata
Introduced as a generalization of word languages in formal language theory, tree languages
describe sets of directed trees or terms. Their defining formalisms tree automata and regular
tree grammars found a wide array of uses. Automata in areas of formal verification and
automated reasoning as parts of decision procedures for logics. Grammars in areas of
computational linguistics and programming languages.
3.2.1 Ranked Alphabets, Terms and Trees
Definition 3.2.1 (Ranked Alphabet). Let ℱ be a finite set of symbols, N the set of natural
numbers and 𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 : ℱ → N a function. A ranked alphabet is the tuple (ℱ , 𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦). The
arity of a symbol 𝑓 ∈ ℱ is denoted 𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑓) and the set ℱ𝑛 = {𝑓 | 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹 ∧𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑓) = 𝑛} is
the set of symbols of arity 𝑝. Symbols of arity 0, 1, . . . , 𝑝 are respectively called constants,
unary symbols, . . . , 𝑛-ary symbols.
Definition 3.2.2 (Terms). Let ℱ be a ranked alphabet. The set 𝑇 (ℱ) of terms over the
ranked alphabet ℱ is the smallest set defined by:
∙ ℱ0 ⊆ 𝑇 (ℱ),
∙ if 𝑛 ≥ 1, 𝑓 ∈ ℱ𝑛, 𝑡1, . . . , 𝑡𝑛 ∈ 𝑇 (ℱ), then 𝑓(𝑡1, . . . , 𝑡𝑛) ∈ 𝑇 (ℱ).
Definition 3.2.3 (Tree Domain). Let N be the set of natural numbers and N* the free
monoid1 generated by N with concatenation (·) as the operation and the empty string 𝜀 as
the identity. The prefix order (≤) ⊆ N* × N* is defined as: 𝑢 ≤ 𝑣 def⇐⇒ ∃𝑤 ∈ N* : 𝑣 = 𝑢 · 𝑤.
For 𝑢 ∈ N* and 𝑛 ∈ N, the length |𝑢| is defined inductively: |𝜀| = 0, |𝑢 ·𝑛| = |𝑢|+1. A set 𝑆
is prefix-closed if 𝑢 ≤ 𝑣 ∧ 𝑣 ∈ 𝑆 ⇒ 𝑢 ∈ 𝑆. A tree domain is a finite non-empty prefix-closed
set 𝐷 ⊂ N* satisfying the following property: 𝑢 · 𝑛 ∈ 𝐷 ⇒ ∀1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑛 : 𝑢 · 𝑗 ∈ 𝐷.
Definition 3.2.4 (Finite Tree). Let 𝑇 (ℱ) be a set of terms and 𝐷 a tree domain. A term
𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 (ℱ) can be represented as a finite tree which is a mapping 𝑡 : 𝐷 → ℱ satisfying the
following:
1for a definition see [18]
17
∙ ∀𝑢 ∈ 𝐷 : if 𝑡(𝑢) ∈ ℱ𝑛, 𝑛 ≥ 1 then {𝑗 | 𝑢 · 𝑗 ∈ 𝐷} = {1, . . . , 𝑛}
∙ ∀𝑢 ∈ 𝐷 : if 𝑡(𝑢) ∈ ℱ0 then {𝑗 | 𝑢 · 𝑗 ∈ 𝐷} = ∅
The domain of tree 𝑡 shall be written as 𝑑𝑜𝑚(𝑡) and each element in 𝑑𝑜𝑚(𝑡) represents a
position in 𝑡. The symbol 𝑡(𝜀) is called the root symbol of 𝑡.
Definition 3.2.5 (Height). Let 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 (ℱ) be a term. The height of the term 𝑡, denoted
ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡(𝑡) is defined inductively as
ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡(𝑡) =
{︃
1 if 𝑡 ∈ ℱ0
1 + 𝑚𝑎𝑥({ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡(𝑡𝑖) | 𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑛}}) if 𝑡(𝜀) ∈ ℱ𝑛
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Figure 3.2: An example of a tree 𝑡 (left) and its tree domain 𝐷 (right). ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡(𝑡) = 3
Definition 3.2.6 (Subterm). Let 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 (ℱ) be a term. A subterm of 𝑡 at position 𝑝 denoted
𝑡|𝑝 is defined by the following:
∙ 𝑑𝑜𝑚(𝑡|𝑝) = {𝑗 | 𝑝𝑗 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚(𝑡)},
∙ ∀𝑞 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚(𝑡|𝑝) : 𝑡|𝑝(𝑞) = 𝑡(𝑝𝑞).
3.2.2 Finite Tree Automata
An extension of finite automata which work on words, finite tree automata deal with finite
trees over a ranked alphabet. Indeed words over a finite alphabet can be viewed as terms
over a ranked alphabet of unary symbols and a constant acting as a terminator. For example
the word 𝑥𝑦𝑧 over the alphabet Σ = {𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧} ca be viewed as the term 𝑡 = 𝑥(𝑦(𝑧(#))) over
the ranked alphabet ℱ = {𝑥(), 𝑦(), 𝑧(),#} where # is the added constant.
Similarly to finite automata, finite tree automata can be deterministic and nondeter-
ministic. Finite tree automata however have different properties depending on how the
computation of the automaton is performed. When the computation starts from the leaves
of the tree working its way to the root, the automaton is referred to as bottom-up. In the
opposite case the automaton is a top-down one.
Depending on the direction of computation, determinism has different consequences on
the expressive power of the automaton. Determnistic bottom-up finite tree automata have
the same power as nondeterministic ones and nondeterministic top-down ones. However
deterministic top-down finite tree automata are less powerful [5]. This work will only
consider finite deterministic bottom-up tree automata onwards, referring to them as FDTA.
Definition 3.2.7 (Finite Deterministic Bottom-Up Tree Automaton). A FDTA over a
ranked alphabet ℱ is a tuple
𝒜 = (𝑄,ℱ , 𝛿, 𝑄𝑓 )
where
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∙ 𝑄 is a set of states,
∙ 𝑄𝑓 ⊆ 𝑄 is a set of final states,
∙ 𝛿 = ⋃︀𝑖 𝛿𝑖 is a set of transition relations defined 𝛿0 : ℱ0 → 𝑄 and 𝛿𝑛 : (ℱ𝑛 ×𝑄𝑛) → 𝑄
for 𝑛 > 0.
Definition 3.2.8 (Recognized Tree Language). Let 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 (ℱ) be a term and𝒜 = (𝑄,ℱ , 𝛿, 𝑄𝑓 )
an FDTA. The relation 𝛿𝒜 : 𝑇 (ℱ) → 𝑄 describes the run of FDTA 𝒜 on 𝑡 recursively as:
𝛿𝒜(𝑡) =
{︃
𝛿0(𝑓) if 𝑡(𝜀) = 𝑓 ∧ 𝑓 ∈ ℱ0
𝛿𝑛(𝑓, 𝛿𝒜(𝑡1), . . . , 𝛿𝒜(𝑡𝑛)) if 𝑡(𝜀) = 𝑓(𝑡1, . . . , 𝑡𝑛) ∧ 𝑓 ∈ ℱ𝑛
The tree language recognized by FDTA 𝒜 is the set 𝐿(𝒜) = {𝑡 | 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 (ℱ) ∧ 𝛿𝒜(𝑡) ∈ 𝑄𝑓}.
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Figure 3.3: An accepting run of a FDTA 𝒜 = (𝑄,ℱ , 𝛿, 𝑄𝑓 ) on term 𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑔(𝑎), 𝑔(𝑎)).
𝑄 = {𝑞𝑎, 𝑞𝑔, 𝑞𝑓},ℱ = {𝑓(, ), 𝑔(), 𝑎}, 𝛿0(𝑎) = 𝑞𝑎, 𝛿1(𝑔, 𝑞𝑎) = 𝑞𝑔, 𝛿2(𝑓, 𝑞𝑔, 𝑞𝑔) = 𝑞𝑓 , 𝑄𝑓 = {𝑞𝑓}.
3.2.3 Tree Automata Inference
The field of grammatical inference studies methods and algorithms for machine learning of
formal languages by inferring their models from a set of samples. The set of samples may be
positive or negative. Positive samples are elements of the inferred language, while negative
are not. Research tells that regular word languages cannot be inferred from positive samples
only [12].
The solution is either to learn from positive and negative samples or restricting the
inference to less expressive languages. For regular word languages, inferring a minimal
finite automaton from positive and negative samples is NP-complete [12]. Inferring a non-
minimal automaton is also an option, but there is a risk of exponential blowup of the
automaton size. Using less expressive language families on the other hand presents the
possibility of inferring a state-minimal automaton from positive samples only [10].
K-testable languages present a subclass of regular languages for which the membership
of a string can be decided based on the membership of substrings of a bounded length. This
section presents k-testable tree languages and the construction of a minimal tree automaton
from positive samples only.
Definition 3.2.9 (Placeholders). Let ℱ be a ranked alphabet and Ξ = {𝜉𝑓 | 𝑓 ∈
⋃︀
𝑖>0ℱ𝑖}
be a new set of constants called placeholders such that Ξ ∩ ℱ = ∅. A constant 𝜉𝑓 ∈ Ξ can
only be substituted with a tree 𝑡 for which 𝑡(𝜀) = 𝑓 . Let 𝑇 (ℱ ,Ξ) denote the set of trees
over the ranked alphabet and placeholders.
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Definition 3.2.10 (Link). Let 𝑡, 𝑡′ ∈ 𝑇 (ℱ ,Ξ) be trees. The link operation 𝑡#𝑡′ is defined
as
(𝑡#𝑡′)(𝑛) =
{︃
𝑡(𝑛) if 𝑡(𝑛) /∈ Ξ ∨ (𝑡(𝑛) = 𝜉𝑓 ∧ 𝑓 ̸= 𝑡′(𝜀))
𝑡′(𝑧) if 𝑛 = 𝑦 · 𝑧, 𝑡(𝑦) = 𝜉𝑡′(𝜀), 𝑦 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚(𝑡), 𝑧 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚(𝑡′)
Intuitively the link (𝑡#𝑡′)(𝑛) over represents a substitution of tree 𝑡′ into tree 𝑡 at point
𝑛 in 𝑡. For the operation to be successful 𝑡 needs to have a placeholder symbol 𝜉𝑓 on position
𝑛 and 𝑡′ needs to have symbol 𝑓 as its root. If these conditions are met, the placeholder
symbol in 𝜉𝑓 in 𝑡 is replaced by 𝑡′. Otherwise the operation does nothing and the result is
the unchanged tree 𝑡.
Definition 3.2.11 (Tree Quotient). Let 𝑡, 𝑡′ ∈ 𝑇 (ℱ) be trees. The tree quotient 𝑡−1𝑡′ is
defined as
𝑡−1𝑡′ = {𝑡′′ ∈ 𝑇 (ℱ ,Ξ) | 𝑡′ = 𝑡′′#𝑡}
Given trees 𝑡 and 𝑡′ without placeholder symbols, the tree quotient 𝑡−1𝑡 is set of trees
containing placeholder symbols and for each tree 𝑡′′ in the set has the property, that 𝑡 can
be linked into 𝑡′′ to form 𝑡. Furthermore, the tree quotient operation can also be extended
to sets in the following manner: 𝑡−1𝑆 = {𝑡−1𝑡 | 𝑡′ ∈ 𝑆}.
Definition 3.2.12 (K-Root). Let 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 (ℱ) be a tree. For 𝑘 ≥ 0 a k-root of 𝑡 is defined as:
𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑘(𝑡) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
𝑡 if 𝑡(𝜀) ∈ ℱ0
𝜉𝑓 if 𝑓 = 𝑡(𝜀), 𝑓 ∈
⋃︀
𝑖>0ℱ𝑖, 𝑘 = 0
𝑓(𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑘−1(𝑡1), . . . , 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑘−1(𝑡𝑛)) if 𝑡 = 𝑓(𝑡1, . . . , 𝑡𝑛), ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡(𝑡) > 𝑘 > 0
Theorem 3.2.1 (K-Testable Tree Language [17]). Let 𝐿 ⊆ 𝑇 (ℱ) be a tree language. 𝐿 is 𝑘-
testable in the strict sense if and only if for any 𝑡1, 𝑡2 ∈ 𝑇 (ℱ) such that 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑘(𝑡1) = 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑘(𝑡2),
when 𝑡−11 𝐿 ̸= 0 ∧ 𝑡−12 𝐿 ̸= 0 then it follows that 𝑡−11 𝐿 = 𝑡−12 𝐿.
Definition 3.2.13 (Root Equivalence). Trees 𝑡1, 𝑡2 ∈ 𝑇 (ℱ) are root-equivalent with degree
k for some 𝑘 ≥ 0, denoted 𝑡1 ∼𝑘 𝑡2 if and only if 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑘(𝑡1) = 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑘(𝑡2). The ∼𝑘 relation is
also a congruence of finite index.
Definition 3.2.14 (∼𝑘-Induced Tree Automaton). Let 𝑇 ′ ⊆ 𝑇 (ℱ) be finite set of trees.
The 𝐴∼𝑘(𝑇 ′) = (𝑄,ℱ , 𝛿, 𝑄𝑓 ) automaton induced by the root equivalence relation ∼𝑘 is
defined as:
𝑄 = {𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑘(𝑡′) | ∃𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 ′ : ∃𝑢 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚(𝑇 ′) : 𝑡′|𝑢}
𝑄𝑓 = {𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑘(𝑡) | 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 ′}
𝛿0(𝑓) = 𝑓 for 𝑓 ∈ ℱ𝑛
𝛿𝑛(𝑓, 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑘(𝑡1), . . . , 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑘(𝑡𝑛)) = 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑘(𝑓(𝑡1, . . . , 𝑡𝑛)) for 𝑛 ≥ 1, 𝑓 ∈ ℱ𝑛
Theorem 3.2.2 ([2]). 𝐿(𝐴∼𝑘) is 𝑘-testable in the strict sense.
Theorem 3.2.3 ([9]). 𝐿(𝐴∼𝑘+1) ⊆ 𝐿(𝐴∼𝑘)
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3.3 The LLVM Compiler Infrastructure
LLVM is a collection of tools and libraries for building compilers, toolchain technologies and
code analyzers. At the core of the framework is the LLVM intermediate representation (IR).
LLVM IR is a SSA-based, RISC-like assembly language used to represent code throughout
the framework. The IR code can be serialized into a textual or binary form, which allows
for compile-time, link-time and even ”idle-time“ transformations. The core LLVM tools arebuilt around the IR and manipulate it. The tools include an assembler to the binary format
of the IR, disassembler to the textual form of the IR, an optimizer that runs transformation
passes over the IR, a linker which combines serialized IR files and several others.
A number of projects have been made using the LLVM framework. The original project
is Clang, a compiler front-end for C-like programming languages. However thanks to its
language-agnostic nature, front ends for other static and dynamic languages have been
made as well as implementations of runtime environments like the Java Virtual Machine.
Another group of projects are static and dynamic code analyzers. Clang includes its
own built-in static analyzer which aims to highlight common mistakes and inefficiencies a
programmer can make. Another static analyzer is KLEE, which uses symbolic execution,
a form of abstract interpretation, to generate test cases for code represented in LLVM
IR. The last example of a static analyzer built on LLVM is LLBMC, a bounded model
checker. As for dynamic analysis, LLVM includes several code instrumentation tools, called
”sanitizers“, which generate additional code for runtime analysis.
3.3.1 Intermediate Representation
The LLVM IR is a target-independent, typed assembly language. The code represented in
the IR is in the single static assignment form which means that each variable in the IR is
only assigned once. This means that each use of a variable can be easily traced back to its
definition, which immensely simplifies analysis and transformations of the IR. The number
of variables that can be assigned this way is not limited. Figure 3.4 shows a piece of C code
and the corresponding LLVM IR.
;yFunctionyAttrs:ynounwindyuwtable
defineyi32y@sum(i32y*a,yi32y*b)yg0y{
entry:
yy*1y=yallocayi32,yaligny4
yy*2y=yallocayi32,yaligny4
yystoreyi32y*b,yi32*y*1,yaligny4
yystoreyi32y*a,yi32*y*2,yaligny4
yy*3y=yloadyi32,yi32*y*1,yaligny4
yy*4y=yloadyi32,yi32*y*2,yaligny4
yy*addy=yaddynswyi32y*3,y*4
yyretyi32y*add
}
intysum(intya,yintyb){
yreturnya+b;
}
Figure 3.4: A C function and the LLVM IR equivalent
Module The contents of a single LLVM IR file, be it binary bitcode or textual assembly
form a module. A module is the top-level data structure in LLVM IR. The module contains
information about target architecture, declarations of structured data types, declarations
of external functions, global variables and a list of function definitions. The relationships
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between functions are apparent on this level and form a call graph, in which nodes represent
functions and an edge from 𝐴 to 𝐵 means that function 𝐴 calls function 𝐵 in its body.
main
A
B C
E
static void E() { }
static void C() { C(); }
static void B() { E(); }
static void A() { B();
                  C(); 
                  E(); }
int main() {
  A();
}
Figure 3.5: An example of a call graph
Function Each function in LLVM IR has a list of formal arguments, a return type and
a body consisting of basic blocks. Additionally it can have a number of optional attributes
specifying a garbage collector, exception information, linkage type and so on. The first
basic block in a function is denoted by the entry label. Local variables have a % prefix
while global variables have a @ one. Relationships between basic blocks are apparent on
this level and form a control flow graph.
entry:
x0[=[alloca[i32,[align[4
x1[=[alloca[i32,[align[4
x2[=[alloca[i32,[align[4
store[i32[xb,[i32*[x0,[align[4
store[i32[xa,[i32*[x1,[align[4
x3[=[load[i32,[i32*[x1,[align[4
x4[=[icmp[ne[i32[x3,[0
br[i1[x4,[label[xl2,[label[xl1
T F
l2:
x7[=[phi[i1[[[true,[xentry[],[[[x6,[xl1[]
xlor.ext[=[zext[i1[x7[to[i32
store[i32[xlor.ext,[i32*[x2,[align[4
ret[void
l1:
x5[=[load[i32,[i32*[x0,[align[4
x6[=[icmp[ne[i32[x5,[0
br[label[xl2
void fun(int a, int b){
    int c = a || b ;
}
Figure 3.6: Control flow graph with a 𝜑-instruction
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Basic Block A collection of IR instructions that is always executed sequentially. A basic
block begins with a label that is used to reference the basic block in control flow instructions
and ends with a terminator instruction, usually a br instruction which jumps to a label of
another basic block or a ret instruction, which exits the function. Each basic block has
a list of successors and predecessors in the control flow graph. In some cases the value of
a variable in the basic block is dependent on the predecessor. To maintain SSA form a
𝜑-instruction must be present in the basic block before the use of the variable.
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Chapter 4
Detector Implementation
This chapter introduces a prototype detector which uses methods of formal analysis and
verification. Since a complete implementation of a behavioral detector exceeds the format
of this work, the detector only implements the interpretation, signature generation and
matching phase of the generic behavioral malware detector defined in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.
The data collection phase is replaced by an LLVM-based obfuscating compiler [15]. Given
a malware source code written in C or C++, the compiler is used to generate a mutation
of the malware by randomly applying the obfuscations implemented in the compiler. The
compiler is then set to output an LLVM IR file. This file represents a raw characteristics
in the context of the generic detector. A set of mutations can be obtained by running the
compiler repeatedly on the same source code. Details about the malware source code and
applied obfuscations are given in Section 4.1.
Interpretation is done by processing the obfuscated LLVM IR files in two steps. The
first step is using static taint analysis, which is formalized as an abstract interpretation.
The analysis is implemented as a pass over LLVM IR using the tools and libraries avail-
able in the LLVM framework. The output of the analysis is a syscall dependency graph,
which represents the high-level abstraction of malware behavior. The second step of the
interpretation phase is unfolding the cycles of the syscall dependecy graph. This is done
as a preliminary step before signature generation, which needs the graphs to be acyclic.
Section 4.2 covers the details about static taint analysis, syscall dependency graphs and the
unfolding algorithm.
Signature generation is also done in two steps. The first step is taking a syscall depen-
dency graph, which is a directed acyclic graph and transforming it into a maximally-shared
graph. A maximally-shared graph is again a directed acyclic graph, but in a form that is
free from redundant subgraphs and folded into a form that can be seen as a collection of
trees. The second step is inference of a 𝑘-testable tree automaton from a set of transformed
syscall dependency graphs. The inferred automaton acts as a behavioral signature which
can match the set of syscall dependency graphs it was inferred from, as well as variants
it has not seen before. Section 4.3 describes the inference algorithm and the preceeding
transformation. The section is based on [2] and the detector takes advantage of tools made
by the authors.
Using an inferred 𝑘-testable tree automaton, the detector performs matching of unknown
syscall dependency graphs. The unknown graph is first transformed in the same manner
as training graphs during signature generation, so that it can be viewed as a collection of
trees. Then the trees contained in the graph are matched against the inferred automaton
and a score is computed based on the amount of trees matched and their height. The higher
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the score, the more likely the graph represents malicious behavior. Section 4.4 describes
the details of how the scores are computed and relationships between malicious behavior
and tree height. Same as with signature generation, the section is based on [2] and uses the
same tools.
4.1 Mutation Generation
As mentioned in Chapter 2, malware is most commonly found in the form of binary ex-
ecutable files. Obtaining malware in the form of C or C++ code was the first challenge.
Thankfully various internet community forums, such as [20] host discussion about devel-
oping malware and often provide examples for educational and hobbyist purposes. The
obtained source code samples target hosts running various versions of the Windows oper-
ating system and use various functions of the Windows API. The samples include three
implementations of a keylogger and two file infecting viruses. The complexity of the imple-
mentations ranges from simple single-threaded code to multi-threaded code in which each
thread is responsible for different malicious behavior.
4.1.1 Obfuscator-LLVM
Mutations are generated from the obtained malware source code by using Obfuscator-
LLVM, or ollvm for short. The obfuscating compiler was built for the purpose of intel-
lectual property protection, but its obfuscating transformations of LLVM IR can be used
for the purpose of mutation generation. Four obfuscating transformations are available in
the public version of ollvm. One of these is instruction substitution, which is covered in
Chapter 2, Section 2.1.2. The description of the other three follows.
Basic Block Splitting As the name suggests, this transformation splits basic blocks
at random locations and recovers original control flow by inserting unconditional branch
instructions. The main purpose of this transformation is to amplify the effect of other
obfuscations in ollvm.
Control Flow Flattening Designed for the purpose of making control flow analysis
ineffective and expensive, the obfuscation transforms control flow inside a function to a flat
structure using switch-case constructs. Original control flow is preserved using a control
variable in a designated basic block.
Bogus Control Flow An advanced form of dead code insertion which makes use of
opaque predicates. Extra basic blocks are insterted into the control flow of a function.
These basic blocks contain a conditional jump to the original basic block and to a cloned
version of it. However the jump is always made to the original basick block because the
predicate always evaluates to the same value. The predicate is constructed in such a way
that it is hard to evaluate statically. Futhermore some junk code is added into the original
and the cloned basic block and inconsequential control flow from the cloned basic block is
added. Finally one more opaque predicate is added to the original basic block, finishing a
dead control flow loop.
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4.2 Interpretation
The interpretation phase of the prototype detector analyzes LLVM IR by using static
taint analysis and builds a syscall dependency graph. A syscall dependency graphs is a
general directed graph and acts as a high-level abstraction of program behavior. Nodes
of the graph represent calls to functions provided by the operating system and an edge
from node 𝐴 to node 𝐵 represents a data dependecy between the calls. The dependency
can be described as ”call 𝐵 uses data computed from the result of call 𝐴“. Dependencygraphs were chosen as the behavior abstraction because they abstract from all internal
computations of the malware (where most obfuscations happen) and focus only on how
the malware interacts with its host system. Although some aspects of the interaction
be changed through obfuscation, for example, the order in which the syscalls are made,
the dependecies between them generally do not change. Static taint analysis provides the
information needed to build the dependency graphs by tracking the flow of data between
two points in code.
4.2.1 Static Taint Analysis
The idea behind static taint analysis is to mark the data we wish to track as tainted, mark
the origins of tainted data as taint sources and mark points beyond which we do not track
tainted data as taint sinks. Taints then flow through the code according to predefined
propagation rules. This notion is formalized in definition 4.2.1.
Definition 4.2.1. Let Var be set of program variables, Instr an instruction set, Src ⊆
Instr a set of taint sources and Snk ⊆ Instr a set of taint sinks. Static taint analysis is
an abstract interpretation
𝐼 = (𝑄, ∘,⊑,⊥,⊤, 𝜏)
where
∙ 𝑄 is a set of mappings of the form 𝐶 : Var→ 2𝑇 ,
∙ ∘ : 𝑄×𝑄→ 𝑄 is a join operator such that ∀𝑎 ∈ Var : (𝐶1 ∘ 𝐶2)(𝑎) = 𝐶1(𝑎) ∪ 𝐶2(𝑎),
∙ (⊑) ⊆ 𝑄×𝑄 is a partial order such that 𝐶1 ⊑ 𝐶2 ⇐⇒ ∀𝑎 ∈ Var : 𝐶1(𝑎) ⊆ 𝐶2(𝑎),
∙ ⊥ is a mapping 𝐶 such that ∀𝑎 ∈ Var : 𝐶(𝑎) = ∅,
∙ ⊤ is a mapping 𝐶 such that ∀𝑎 ∈ Var : 𝐶(𝑎) = 𝑇 ,
∙ 𝜏 : Instr×𝑄→ 𝑄 is an interpretation of abstract transformers such that
∀I ∈ Instr, ∀𝐶 ∈ 𝑄 : 𝜏(I, 𝐶) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒(I, 𝐶) if I ∈ Src
𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑘(I, 𝐶) if I ∈ Snk
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒(I, 𝐶) otherwise
For an abstract context 𝐶 and an instruction I:
∙ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒(I, 𝐶) taints outputs of I by the union of taints carried by inputs of I,
∙ 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒(I, 𝐶) uses 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒(I, 𝐶) and additionally taints outputs of I by I,
∙ 𝑆𝑖𝑛𝑘(I, 𝐶) sets all taints carried by inputs of I to ∅.
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Algorithm 1: Static Taint Analysis
Input: Function 𝐹 , Empty abstract contexts 𝐶𝐵1 , . . . , 𝐶𝐵𝑛 , Graph 𝐺;
Output: Filled abstract contexts {𝐶𝐵1 , . . . , 𝐶𝐵𝑛}, Updated Graph 𝐺;
1 Queue 𝑊 ← ∅;
2 foreach basic block B in F do
3 𝑊.𝑒𝑛𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑢𝑒(𝐵);
4 end
5 while 𝑊 ̸= ∅ do
6 𝐵 ←𝑊.𝑑𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑢𝑒();
7 𝐶𝑛𝑒𝑤 ← ∅;
8 foreach predecessor P of B do
9 𝐶𝑛𝑒𝑤 ← 𝐶𝑛𝑒𝑤 ∘ 𝐶𝑃 ;
10 end
11 foreach instruction I in B do
12 if I is a taint sink then
13 foreach operand O of I do
14 if O is pointer-type variable then
15 𝐶𝑛𝑒𝑤(𝑂) ← ∅;
16 end
17 foreach taint T in 𝐶𝑛𝑒𝑤(𝑂) do
18 add edge (𝑇, 𝐼) to 𝐺;
19 end
20 end
21 end
22 if I is a taint source then
23 foreach operand O of I do
24 if O is pointer-type variable then
25 𝐶𝑛𝑒𝑤(𝑂) ← 𝐶𝑛𝑒𝑤(𝑂) ∪ {𝐼};
26 end
27 end
28 𝐶𝑛𝑒𝑤(𝐼) ← 𝐶𝑛𝑒𝑤(𝐼) ∪ {𝐼};
29 else
30 foreach operand O of I do
31 𝐶𝑛𝑒𝑤(𝐼) ← 𝐶𝑛𝑒𝑤(𝐼) ∪ 𝐶𝑛𝑒𝑤(𝑂);
32 end
33 end
34 end
35 if 𝐶𝑛𝑒𝑤 ̸= 𝐶𝐵 then
36 𝐶𝐵 ← 𝐶𝑛𝑒𝑤;
37 foreach successor S of B do
38 𝑊.𝑒𝑛𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑢𝑒(𝑆);
39 end
40 end
41 end
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The first step when implementing static taint analysis over LLVM IR is to define
taint sources and taint sinks. Since the goal is to build a syscall dependency graph, data
flowing from one syscall to another needs to be tracked. In LLVM IR, syscalls can be
recognized as calls to functions provided by the Windows API. However LLVM IR does
not provide a way to efficiently distinquish between functions from the Windows API and
other externally referenced functions. A robust solution to this problem would be to build a
list of Windows API functions and check the name of functions against the list. This would
however introduce a significant time overhead to the work. A reasonable approximation
was found by inspecting the input LLVM IR. All Windows API functions had a dllimport
tag associated with them, which made them stand out among other functions.
After recognizing taint sinks and sources, abstract contexts need to be defined. These
are straightforward since LLVM provides map-like data structures for mapping LLVM IR
variables onto arbitrary data structures and types, including sets of instruction references.
This way every LLVM IR variable has a set of references to call instructions associated
with it in a map.
Finally abstract transformers create, sink and propagate taints between abstract con-
texts. A call instruction in LLVM IR calls a function with a set of arguments and returns
a single result which is assigned according to the SSA form. In this case the transformers
can use the explicit def-use chains provided by LLVM IR and easily propagate taints from
sources to sinks and tainting variables along the way. However a large number of functions
in the Windows API returns results via variables passed by a pointer reference. In these
cases the SSA form does not apply and the taints need to be propagated differently. Algo-
rithm 1 describes the propagation of taints in such a setting. It is also important to note
that the algorithm updates a whole program dependency graph 𝐺. This is done precisely
because the output abstract contexts do not reflect the evolution of variables passed into
call instructions by a pointer reference. Another solution would be track evolution of such
variables in separate abstract contexts or implement a SSA form for memory in LLVM
IR.
4.2.2 Graph Unfolding
After running static taint analysis on all functions in an LLVM module, a complete depen-
dency graph for that module is obtained. However, the graph will contain cycles in cases
when Windows API functions are called in a cycle and are dependent on each other. These
cycles need to be unfolded before the dependency graph can be used in the subsequent
parts of the detector. The usual way to unfold cycles in graphs is to use a breadth-first
search or depth-first search algorithm. This would result in a set of trees, but information
about call dependencies would be lost by losing certain edges in the graph.
Algorithm 2 was implemented as an alternative way of unfolding dependency graphs.
The algorithm first obtains a set of all back edges by running a depth-first search algorithm
on a given dependency graph. Each back edge in the set identifies a cycle in the graph. For
each back edge in the set, a breadth-first search traversal of the given dependency graph
is performed, starting from the end node of the back edge. During the traversal, a copy of
the traversed subgraph is made. When the algorithm encounters the starting back edge,
it creates an edge that bridges the original graph and the copy, and sets the copy of the
starting back edge as the new back edge to be unfolded. The number of times a single back
edge is unfolded is given by the factor 𝑘. When 𝑘 unfoldings are reached, the algorithm
removes the current back edge and terminates.
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Algorithm 2: Unfolder
Input: Graph 𝐺 = (𝑉,𝐸), back edge (𝑢, 𝑣), factor 𝑘
Output: Graph 𝐺 with cycle containing (𝑢, 𝑣) unfolded
1 foreach 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘 do
2 Queue 𝑄← {𝑣}, 𝐶 ← {𝑣}, 𝑐← ∅, 𝑛← ∅, 𝑒← (𝑢, 𝑣);
3 while 𝑄 ̸= ∅ do
4 𝑎← 𝑄.𝑑𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑢𝑒();
5 𝑎′ ← 𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑦(𝑎);
6 foreach node 𝑏 adjacent to 𝑎 do
7 𝑏′ ← 𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑦(𝑏);
8 𝑉 ← 𝑉 ∪ {𝑎′, 𝑏′};
9 𝐸 ← 𝐸 ∪ {(𝑎′, 𝑏′)};
10 if (a,b) = e then
11 𝑐← (𝑎, 𝑏′);
12 𝑛← (𝑎′, 𝑏′);
13 end
14 if 𝑏 /∈ 𝐶 then
15 𝐶 ← 𝐶 ∪ {𝑏};
16 𝑄.𝑒𝑛𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑢𝑒(𝑏);
17 end
18 end
19 end
20 𝐸 ← 𝐸 ∖ {𝑒};
21 𝐸 ← 𝐸 ∪ {𝑐};
22 𝑒← 𝑛;
23 end
24 𝐸 ← 𝐸 ∖ {𝑒};
4.3 Signature generation
The core of signature generation are 𝑘-testable tree automaton inference algorithms pre-
sented in [2] and implemented in tools available at [1]. The algorithm starts by transforming
a set of dependency graphs into maximally-shared graphs. This is done by eliminating re-
dundant subgraphs and making nodes share common subgraphs. The resulting graph can
also be viewed as a collection of folded trees. Nodes that do not have any predecessors are
roots and nodes that have common subtrees are made to share a single copy of the subtree.
The authors in [2] reference this transformation as common subexpression elimination.
To simplify description, the following algorithms operate on trees and use formal termi-
nology established in Chapter 3, Sections 3.2. The extension of the algorithms to maximally-
shared graphs is done by tracking the visited nodes and making sure that each node is visited
once.
Algorithm 3 traverses tree 𝑡 recursively in postorder. Every subtree has a field 𝑘𝑒𝑦
associated with its root and the field is initially set to a zero value. The ⊕ operator can be
any operation that can combine hashes, e.g., a bitwise XOR. The ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ : ℱ → N function
can be any function used to compute integer hashes from string labels of symbols in the
ranked alphabet. When the algorithm is called once, 𝑘𝑒𝑦 fields of all subtree roots 𝑡𝑠
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Algorithm 3: ComputeKey – Computation of 𝑘-Root Keys (Hashes)
Input: Tree 𝑡, factor 𝑘
Output: Key computed for every subtree of 𝑡
1 𝑡𝑚𝑝← ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝑡(𝜀));
2 foreach 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑡(𝜀)) do
3 𝑡𝑠 ← 𝑡|𝑖;
4 𝑡𝑚𝑝← 𝑡𝑚𝑝⊕ ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝑡𝑠.𝑘𝑒𝑦);
5 ComputeKey(𝑡𝑠, 𝑘);
6 end
7 𝑡.𝑘𝑒𝑦 ← 𝑡𝑚𝑝;
Algorithm 4: 𝑘-Testable Tree Automaton Inference
Input: Tree 𝑡, factor 𝑘, alphabet ℱ
Output: 𝐴∼𝑘 = (𝑄,ℱ , 𝛿, 𝑄𝑓 )
1 𝑄← ∅, 𝛿 ← ∅, 𝑄𝑓 ← ∅;
2 foreach subtree 𝑡𝑠 ∈ {𝑡|𝑢 | 𝑢 ∈ 𝑑𝑜𝑚(𝑡)} traversed in postorder do
3 if 𝑟𝑒𝑝[𝑡𝑠.𝑘𝑒𝑦] = ∅ then
4 𝑞 ← 𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑘(𝑡𝑠);
5 𝑟𝑒𝑝[𝑡𝑠.𝑘𝑒𝑦] ← 𝑞;
6 𝑄← 𝑄 ∪ {𝑞};
7 end
8 𝑛← 𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑡𝑠(𝜀));
9 𝛿𝑛 ← 𝛿𝑛 ∪
{︀(︀
(𝑡𝑠(𝜀), 𝑟𝑒𝑝[(𝑡𝑠|1).𝑘𝑒𝑦], . . . , 𝑟𝑒𝑝[(𝑡𝑠|𝑛).𝑘𝑒𝑦]), 𝑟𝑒𝑝[𝑡𝑠.𝑘𝑒𝑦]
)︀}︀
;
10 𝛿 ← 𝛿 ∪ 𝛿𝑛;
11 end
12 𝑄𝑓 ← 𝑄𝑓 ∪ {𝑟𝑒𝑝[𝑡.𝑘𝑒𝑦]};
13 return (𝑄,ℱ , 𝛿, 𝑄𝑓 )
contain a hash of their own symbol only. When called twice, the fields will contain hashes
of subtree roots and their children. This way, after 𝑘 calls, the 𝑘𝑒𝑦 fields will contain a hash
for the 𝑘-root of their subtrees. When processing graphs with multiple roots, an auxiliary
super-root is created, the original roots are connected to the super-root and the algorithm
is called 𝑘 times with the super-root as the operand.
Algorithm 4 constructs the 𝐴∼𝑘 automaton, by traversing the tree (or maximally-shared
graph) 𝑡 in postorder. The algorithm creates states and transition relations of the automa-
ton using representatives of ∼𝑘-induced equivalence classes stored in the 𝑟𝑒𝑝 hash map,
with representative of 𝑡 being the final state. As before, graphs with multiple roots are
handled via a super-root.
4.4 Matching
Given an inferred 𝑘-testable tree automaton the detector is able to perform matching of an
unknown dependency graph. Same as in the signature generation phase, the dependency
graph is first transformed into a maximally-shared graph by performing common subex-
pression elimination. Each tree contained in the maximally-shared graph is then matched
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against the inferred automaton. If the automaton accepts, the tree is marked as malicious.
After checking all of the trees, a scoring function is used to determine if the input depen-
dency graph, as a whole, is malicious or not. A scoring function can simply be the ratio of
accepted trees to the total number of the trees contained in the maximally-shared graph.
𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =
∑︀
𝑖
𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖
· 𝑖∑︀
𝑖 𝑖
(4.1)
A more sophisticated scoring function is given in [2] and shown in Equation 4.1. The
function takes into account the height of the tree, with trees of greater height being more sig-
nificantly represented in the score. This is done because malware often executes dependent
syscalls in a cycle, which produces dependency graphs containing trees of greater height.
Althought the implemented detector produces dependency graphs statically, thus without
executing the malware, the cyclic behavior is pronounced by the unfolding performed after
static taint analysis. This makes the scoring function applicable for the detector.
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Chapter 5
Detector Testing
In this chapter, we describe several experiments that we have performed with our detector.
The experiments were based on the following malware samples, which were obtained from
various hobbyist internet forums, such as [20]:
∙ keylogger1: A simple implementation of a keylogger which uses the Windows API
function GetKeyNameText as its main way of recognizing the pressed key.
∙ keylogger2: This keylogger uses GetAsyncKeyState to get information about the
pressed key. It also modifies the operating system registries to ensure that its repeat-
edly started.
∙ zwclose-CTS: A file infecting virus with self-encryption capabilities, using a simple
XOR cipher. The infector works in a single thread.
∙ zwclose-ZeroX: An advanced file infector which works in three threads and has also
desctructive capabilities.
The detector was tested using test sets of dependency graphs derived from mutations
generated by ollvm using instruction substitution, control-flow flattening and bogus control
flow. For each experiment, 100 mutations were generated. We now describe the particular
experiments that we performed.
Experiment 1. In this experiment, we considered keylogger1, keylogger2 and zwclose-
ZeroX. Each mutation was generated by using random combinations of the above mentioned
obfuscations. The obtained mutations were analyzed by the static taint analysis described
in Section 4.2. The resulting syscall dependency graphs were unfolded once. Half of the
unfolded graphs were used to infer a 𝑘-testable tree automaton, the other half was used
for matching as graphs of unknown origin. The detection rate obtained using a simple
ratio scoring function was 0.91. When Equation 4.1 was used as the scoring function, the
detection rate was 0.96. The success of the detection is thus quite high.
Experiment 2. In the second experiment, we considered the same malware samples as
above and we used the same mutation schema. However, this time we did not unfold the
dependency graphs. The detection rate obtained using a simple ratio scoring function was
0.72. When Equation 4.1 was used as the scoring function, the detection rate was 0.52.
This shows that the graph unfolding has a significant impact on the success of the detector.
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Experiment 3. In the third experiment, we considered the keylogger samples. In this
case mutations of one keylogger sample were used to infer the tree automaton and the
mutations of the other sample were used for matching. No unfolding was performed and
the detection rate was 0 using both scoring functions. This can be attributed to the fact
that both of the keyloggers use quite different means to implement their functionality. The
same result was obtained regardless of which of the keyloggers was used for inference and
which for the matching.
Experiment 4. The fourth experiment differs from the third only in applying unfolding.
The results do not differ.
Experiment 5. The fifth experiment is again similar to the third experiment, but uses
zwclose-ZeroX and zwclose-CTS as malware samples. Unfolding was again not performed.
The results are still low, with detection rate being 0.05 / 0.1 using a simple scoring function
or 0.02 / 0.03 using the more sophisticated scoring function (depending on which of the
two malware samples is used for inference and which for matching). Despite these numbers
are still low, they show that there is at least some chance of recognizing similar behavior
in two different implementations of malware.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this thesis we have studied methods for behavioral malware detection, which use tech-
niques of formal verification. In particular we built on the work [2], which uses inference of
𝑘-testable tree automata from syscall dependency graphs. We designed and implemented a
prototype detector using the LLVM compiler framework. For experiments with the detector
we used an obfuscating compiler capable of generating mutations of malware from C/C++
source code. We performed some preliminary experiments to evaluate capabilities of the
detector. The detector was quite successful in recognizing mutations of known malware.
However, its capabilities of recognizing unknown malware, which was tested by training the
detector on one implementation of malware of a certain kind and then trying the detection
on a completely different implementation of the same kind of malware, were rather limited.
In the future, more thorough experimental evaluation should be performed. Apart from
that, various improvements of the detector are possible. For instance, one can try to exploit
more of the semantics of functions from Windows API. For instance one could recognize
whether a given function truly has the semantics of a taint source or sink. Next, one could
also employ advanced methods of dead code elimination to de-obfuscate the LLVM IR.
Particularly in the case of obfuscations with opaque predicates, this could be of significant
help.
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